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AbstractWe develop a search model of marriage where men and women draw utility
from private consumption and leisure, and from a non-market good that is produced
in the home using time resources. We condition individual decisions on wages, ed-
ucation and an index of family attitudes. A match-specific, stochastic bliss shock
induces variation in matching given wages, education and family values, and triggers
renegotiation and divorce. Using BHPS (1991-2008) data, we take as given changes
in wages, education and family values by gender, and study their impact on marriage
decisions and intrahousehold resource allocation. The model allows to evaluate how
much of the observed gender differences in labor supply results from wages, educa-
tion and family attitudes. We find that family attitudes is a strong determinant of
comparative advantages in home production of men and women, whereas education
complementarities induce assortative mating through preferences.
Keywords: Search-matching, Bargaining, Assortative mating, Collective models,
Time uses, Social norms, Gender identity, Structural estimation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Since WWII the labor force participation of married women has increased dramatically. Many expla-
nations have been proposed: technological change in the household (Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov, and
Santos, 2016, is a recent contribution), contraception (Goldin and Katz, 2002), changes in wage distri-
butions by gender and experience (e.g. Knowles, 2013), cultural change (Fernández, 2013), structural
change in the economy (Galor and Weil, 1996), child care (Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos, 2008),
divorce laws (Fernández and Wong, 2014). By 1990, the labor supply of married women has reached a
plateau, and yet strong differences in time uses persist between men and women, and between single
and married persons. Using British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data, we thus observe that between
1991 and 2008 married women increase market work and reduce non-market work, but at a very low
pace in comparison to the preceding decades (see Section 3 for details). However, during the same period,
important changes occur simultaneously in wages: the marriage gap increases for both genders, and more
so for men than women; the gender wage gap is slowly closing. Considerable changes in the education
of married women are also happening (70% of high school dropouts in 1991, 45% in 2004), and social
attitudes are slowly but steadily trending away from the traditional model of the family.
Hence, standard macroeconomic methods focusing on aggregate change are becoming less useful in the
post-1990 period. Structural models need to give more room to individual heterogeneity in preferences
and home production. In this paper, we shall assume that individuals differ from each other by their wage,
their education, and by social attitudes measured by questions like “Do you approve of a married woman
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earning money in business or industry if she has a husband capable of supporting her?” (Fernández, 2013)
or “If a woman earns more money than her husband, it’s almost certain to cause problems” (Bertrand,
Kamenica, and Pan, 2015).
We build a model of marriage, and time and income sharing where the only marriage externality is a
public good that is produced in the household. Home production requires time inputs from both spouses,
and depends on spouses’ gender, education and an index of family values, constructed by aggregating a
set of questions on social attitudes collected in the BHPS. The home-production function exhibits two
types of complementarities: first between time uses, second between exogenous individual characteristics
(education and family attitudes). The level of home production also depends on a bliss variable that
is drawn when a couple meets for the first time, and is infrequently updated after marriage so as to
endogenously generate divorce. Men and women share resources by Nash bargaining. Finally, forward-
looking singles need to forecast their chances of dating other singles of any type. We thus assume that,
in a given year, divorce flows approximately equal marriage flows. This steady-state assumption allows
to solve for equilibrium distributions of individual types by gender and marital status. In the empirical
application, we further assume that the economy jumps from one 3-year steady state to the next, following
exogenous changes in the distributions of wages, education and family values indices by gender.
As Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015), we observe that marriage is much less probable if the woman
is paid by the hour more than the man, and when such a marriage occurs, she works fewer hours. However,
this pattern is much more pronounced for conservative households than for progressive ones (depending
of spouses’ family values indices). The distribution of female-to-male earnings ratios is very asymmetric
with a mode at 0.1 for conservative couples, whereas it is nearly symmetric for liberal couples with a
much higher mode around 0.4.
The model fits these empirical regularities very well and reveals how the comparative advantages of
men and women in home production depend on family attitudes. We then ask the following question:
what would happen if we were making all individuals culturally liberal? We find that the distribution of
labor earnings ratios would become nearly symmetric around a mode that is close to the mode of wage
ratios. The labor supply of married women would still be lower than men’s by about 10%, a difference
that can easily be explained by the gender wage gap (assuming that changing family attitudes would not
affect the wage gap).
We also estimate how marriage probabilities depend on spouses’ education, family values and wages.
We find strong evidence of education homophily (love of same). However, for family values homophily
is not uniform: conservative individuals prefer a conservative partner but progressive individuals are not
picky. The model traces the origin of this latter pattern to different comparative advantages in home
production of men and women with different family values, whereas for education it is just a matter of
tastes. Finally, there is very little homophily based on wages. Women are just more likely to marry richer
men. Marriage probabilities barely depend on female wages. Again, this is a direct consequence of the
specific structure of the home production function.
We finally quantify the share of income that is privately consumed by male and female spouses (the
sharing rule). In the model, the sharing rule is the sum of the bargaining coefficient and a component that
reflects the outside options of each spouse. We find that men capture 55% of household total expenditure
on private consumption and leisure, which decomposes into 45% for the bargaining coefficient and 10%
due to a market advantage of men in the marriage market. The sharing rule is unaffected by family values
and exhibits a compensating differential pattern with respect to education, with redistribution operating
toward the least educated spouse. On the other hand, we estimate that the richer spouse absorbs a
greater share of the rent.
The layout of the paper is as follows. After a brief review of the literature on household behavior,
we describe salient features of intrahousehold allocation of time and spouses matching between 1991
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and 2008. Then we construct the search-matching-and-bargaining model and we solve the equilibrium
for a special specification of preferences. The next section describes the empirical specification, studies
identification and develops the estimation procedure. We then show the results. The appendix deals with
technical details.
2. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON MARRIAGE AND INTRAHOUSEHOLD RESOURCE
ALLOCATION
Lundberg and Pollak (1996) end their insightful survey on bargaining and distribution in marriage by
stating that “bargaining models provide an opportunity for integrating the analysis of distribution within
marriage with a matching or search model of the marriage market.” Since then the search-matching-and-
bargaining framework has been widely used in applied macroeconomics in the perspective of understand-
ing long term changes such as declining marriage rates or rising female labor supply. Aiyagari, Greenwood,
and Guner (2000), Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2000, 2003), Caucutt, Guner, and Knowles (2002),
Gould and Paserman (2003), Fernandez, Guner, and Knowles (2005) are early examples of applications
(see the first paragraph for more recent references).
The search-matching-and-bargaining project took time to take off in applied microeconomics because
Chiappori (1988, 1992), Apps and Rees (1988) introduced the collective framework in the late 1980s,
which has remained dominant for a long time.1 Their point is that in order to model individual consump-
tion and labor supply in situations where household resources are shared cooperatively, Nash bargaining
is an unnecessary restriction. Pareto optimality is sufficient to derive testable restrictions. However, as
emphasized by Lundberg and Pollak, policy interventions affecting the distribution of resources within
the family can have very different short-run and long-run effects because of marriage market equilibrium
feedback. Collective models very successfully describe resource sharing within the family given a sharing
rule. A matching model – that is an equilibrium model of the marriage market – is required in order
to endogenize the distribution of powers in the family (Chiappori, 2012). For example, if education and
wage differentials by gender change over time, this will have an effect on couples’ labor supply for a given
way of sharing resources, but this may also affect individuals’ outside options and the sharing rule itself.
In the standard search model singles meet mates sequentially; they share resources according to Nash
bargaining with singlehood as threat point; marriage is realized if there exists a jointly profitable resource
allocation; the distributions of individual types by gender and marital status are calculated at the steady
state equilibrium. Shimer and Smith (2000), Atakan (2006), Lauermann and Nöldeke (2015) and Manea
(2017) provide theoretical studies of equilibrium existence.
Search-matching is not the only way of modeling a marriage market. Long after the seminal work
of Becker (1973, 1974, 1981), and Grossbard-Shechtman’s (1984) introduction of household production,
Choo and Siow (2006) revive the perfect-information assignment framework of Shapley and Shubik
(1971), and develop an econometric model of matching between heterogeneous men and women that is
the stable-matching equivalent of Wong’s (2003) empirical application of Shimer and Smith (2000).2 A
series of applications of this framework followed, including Chiappori and Oreffice (2008), Chiappori,
Iyigun, and Weiss (2009), Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2016). Choo, Seitz, and Siow (2008) is a first
attempt at introducing labor supply in the Choo and Siow model, and Chiappori, Costa Dias, and
Meghir (2015) is a big step forward, introducing not only labor supply and endogenous education (like
Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov, and Santos 2016), but also savings and unobserved heterogeneity.
What is the best framework for a marriage market? There is still little literature on this subject. Adachi
1Other important developments can be found in Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, and Lechene, 1994, Browning and
Chiappori, 1998, Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix, 2002, Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac, and Meghir, 2007. A dynamic version
of the collective model was explored by Mazzocco (2004, 2007).
2Useful connections between the Choo-Siow model and optimal transportation theory were made by Galichon and Salanié
(2012) and Dupuy and Galichon (2014).
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(2003) shows that, as search costs disappear, the set of equilibrium outcomes of a search matching model
with non-transferable utility converges to the set of stable equilibria of a Gale-Shapley marriage model.
Recently, Lauermann and Nöldeke (2015) tone this prediction down by proving that it holds if and only
if there is a unique stable matching in the underlying marriage market. With multiple stable matchings,
sequences of equilibrium matchings converging to unstable, inefficient matchings can be constructed. We
do not know of any result for transferable utility models. Still, the search framework can be thought
of as a tâtonnement mechanism, whose equilibrium outcomes are hopefully not too far from the stable
matchings of the corresponding frictionless economy. Tâtonnement models are empirically appealing
because they are usually easier to simulate, absent of coordination issues and strategic behavior, and
they naturally generate the sluggishness that seem to be a general characteristic of many markets.
3. DATA AND FACTS
BHPS data
We use the original British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) sample of 5,050 British households and
9,092 adults interviewed in the first wave (1991). The panel interviews all adult members of all households
comprising either an original sample member or an individual born to an original sample member every
year until 2008. It therefore remains broadly representative of the British population (excluding Northern
Ireland and North of the Caledonian Canal) as it changes over time. We only keep individuals who are
either single or married to (or cohabiting with) an heterosexual partner, and who are between 22 and 50
years of age at the time of interview. To reduce non response biases we use the Individual Respondent
Weights provided in the survey.
We keep data on usual gross pay per month for the current job, the number of hours normally worked
per week (including paid and unpaid overtime hours) and the number of hours spent in a week doing
housework (core non market work excluding child caring and rearing, information not provided by the
survey). Hourly wage is the usual gross pay per month divided by the number of hours normally worked
per month (without overtime). Wages are deflated by the Consumer Price Index and computed in 2008
pounds.
In order to reduce the number of labor supply corners (zero market hours and missing wages) we
replace current observations on wages and market hours by a moving average of past, present and future
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where φ is the standard normal PDF and k is a smoothing parameter that we arbitrarily choose equal
to 2, yielding weights 1, 0.882, 0.607, 0.325, 0.135, 0.044, 0.011 for 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 years apart. Then we
trim the 1% top and bottom tails of wage and time use variables. We thus obtain an unbalanced panel
of 18 years (1991-2008), whose cross-sectional sizes remain roughly constant over the years with about
1000-1200 couples and 400 singles of each sex, the fraction of married men and women being remarkably
stable at around 70%.
Trends
The rather short period of time between 1991 and 2008 has produced some remarkable changes in
time uses, wages and education by gender and marital status.3 Figure 1 confirms well known facts about
3See Ramos (2005) and Gimenez-Nadal and Sevilla (2012) for a more detailed description.
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(c) Women, market hours
Year
























Figure 1: Time use trends
market and non market work. Men work more paid hours than women, married men work more than
single men, and all men, married and single, devote the same amount of time (little) to home production.
Married and low-educated women work fewer hours outside the home, and more inside than single and
higher-educated women. Education is not a key determinant for men; it is for women. Male hours are
remarkably stable over time, while female differences by education and marital status are gradually
subsiding.
Interesting composition changes are observable in that period (Figure 2). All groups are converging to
the same educational norm. In 1991, about 45% of single men did not have A-levels, while it was 60%
for married men and single women, and 70% for married women. By 2004 all groups had reduced the
gap to 45%. Wages do not display the same convergence pattern. Married people’s wages increase both
in absolute terms and with respect to the wages of singles. The gender wage gap is smaller for singles
than for married individuals and slowly closes over time for both married and single individuals. Yet,
in 2008, married men still earn 25% more than married women, and single men about 10% more than
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(d) Female/male wage ratio
Figure 2: Composition changes in education and wages
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Wife share of aggregate wage























(a) Wage ratio, wf
wf+wm
Wife share of total labor earnings
















(b) Labor earnings ratio, wfhf
wfhf+wmhm
Figure 3: Distribution density of wages and earnings ratios
single women.
Family values
In a recent paper, Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015) observe that “among married couples in the
US, the distribution of the share of household income earned by the wife drops sharply at 1/2.” Figure
3a shows the distribution of the female wage share ( wfwm+wf ) in the BHPS data. It is symmetric with a
mode between 0.4 and 0.5. The distribution moves a little to the right over time, becoming a bit more
equal (i.e. symmetric around 0.5). The distribution of the female share of labor earnings ( wfhfwmhm+wfhf ) is
however similar to Bertrand et al.’s US estimate (interestingly, more so in 1991-93 than later in 2006-08).
Figure 3b resembles their Figures I and II insofar as the density puts more mass to the left of the mode
than to its right, and is steeply sloping down beyond 0.4. Females work fewer market work when they
are paid more by the hour than their husband.
So, the gender education gap and, to a lesser extent, the gender wage gap are closing over time but
the division of labor inside the family is adjusting much less rapidly. Bertrand et al. reckon that this is
because “slow-moving identity norms are an important factor that limits further convergence in labor
market outcomes.” With this interpretation in mind, in addition to wages and education, we looked for
independent information on social attitudes influencing time uses. Using the responses to various survey
questions about children, marriage, cohabitation and divorces we constructed an index of family values
by Principal Component Analysis. Table I lists the questions used for this construction and displays
the corresponding factor loadings. Given the signs of factor loadings, our Family Values Index (FVI )
is a measure of social conservatism. The Family Values Index is essentially independent of education
and wages. More educated and rich individuals are slightly more liberal, but the regression of FVI on
education and wage by gender has a very low R-squared (2.2% and .5% for women and men respectively).
One might worry that the responses to the BHPS questions could be just another way of measuring
time uses. However, it is likely that by the time men and women have reached the age of looking for
a partner and of choosing an organization of the household, childhood and adolescence have imprinted
representations in their minds that these simple survey questions allow us to measure. We want to know
how people match on social attitudes, and how different attitudes associate with different time uses.
Men are found to be more conservative than women, and couples are more conservative than singles




Pre-school child suffers if mother works -0.24
Family suffers if mother works full-time -0.25
Woman and family happier if she works 0.16
Husband and wife should both contribute 0.14
Full time job makes woman independent 0.12
Husband should earn, wife stay at home -0.21
Children need father as much as mother -0.05
Employers should help with childcare 0.12
Single parents are as good as couples 0.17
Adult children should care for parents -0.07
Divorce better than unhappy marriage 0.12
Attendance at religious services -0.07
Cohabiting is always wrong -0.16
Year




























Notes: The Family Values Index is a weighted sum of all responses (1: strongly agree; 2: agree; 3: neither agree nor
disagree; 4: disagree; 5: strongly disagree). The variable “Attendance at religious service” is coded: 1: Once a week or +; 2:
At least once per month; 3: At least once per year; 4: Practically never; 5: Only weddings etc. After 1998, the item
“Cohabiting is always wrong” became “Cohabiting is alright”. So we changed it as “6 - item_answer” to maintain
coherency over the years. Weights are estimated by Principal Component Analysis and are displayed in the table. The
figure shows the evolution of the mean FVI over time by marital status and gender.
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(a) Market hours by FVI
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(b) Non-market hours by FVI
Figure 4: Time uses by family values
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(1) Wage ratio, wfwf+wm (2) Labor earnings ratio,
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(a) Conservative wives and husbands
Wife share of aggregate wage
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(b) Liberal wives and husbands
Figure 5: Distribution densities of wage and earnings ratios by family values
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(see the figure next to Table I).4 There is a common, steady negative trend, but it is not extremely
pronounced (less than half a point in 18 years on a 1-to-5 scale). Figure 4 shows how family values
determine the market and non-market hours of married men and women. The effect is stronger for
married women’s labor supply and for married men and women’s work in household. For singles there is
no sizable effect.
The distributions of female wage and earnings ratios vary with family values. In Figure 5 we display the
kernel densities of wage and earnings ratios conditional on male and female FVI s being above or below
their respective medians. All wage ratios are symmetric, but couples with both spouses conservative have a
lower and more dispersed wage ratios. Their distribution of earnings ratios is also much more concentrated
to the left. At the other extreme, couples with both spouses liberal have a perfectly symmetric distribution
of wage ratios, more concentrated around a mode that is closer to 0.5, and their distribution of earnings
ratios is the most symmetric of all.
4. MODEL
In this section we develop a model of marriage and intrahousehold decisions, building on the equilibrium
search-bargaining model of Shimer and Smith (2000), which we enrich with labor supply and home
production decisions.
4.1. The marriage market
Men and women are characterized by their market wage (labor productivity) and other individual
characteristics such as education and family values that we call a type. Conventionally, we use the label
i for male types and j for female types. Let `m(i) and `f (j) denote the density functions of male and
female types in the whole population, with Lm =
´
`m(i) di and Lf =
´
`f (j) dj denoting the total
numbers of men and women in the population. Let nm(i), nf (j), Nm, Nf be the corresponding notations
for the sub-populations of single men and women. Letm(i, j) andM =
˜
m(i, j) di dj denote the density
function of couples’ types and the total number of couples. Measures `m, `f are exogenous and measures
nm, nf ,m are endogenous.
Assume that only singles search for a partner, ruling out search for an alternative spouse during
marriage (voluntary and involuntary). Let λ be the number of meetings between singles per unit of
time divided by NmNf (the number of potential meetings). The rates at which male and female singles
meet a potential partner are equal to λNf and λNm. This meeting parameter λ is endogenous and is
a function of Nm and Nf . With quadratic returns, as in Shimer and Smith (2000), λ is constant; but
a more reasonable assumption may be constant returns to scale in the meeting function λNmNf , for
example Cobb-Douglas.
When a female single of type j and a male single of type i meet for the first time, a match-specific
bliss shock z is drawn from a distribution G. The willingness to marry (say WtM(i, j, z) = 1 if yes, = 0
if no) depends on all three variables (i, j, z). Denote αij = Pr{WtM(i, j, z) = 1|i, j} the probability of
marriage given i, j upon meeting.
We also assume that the match-specific bliss shock z is subject to infrequent updates. For simplicity
we assume that in every period, with probability δ, a new value z′ is drawn from G independently of
the current value z. By changing δ we can make the stochastic process of shocks (indexed by calendar
time) more or less persistent. Divorce occurs if WtM(i, j, z′) = 0, and 1−αij is the probability of divorce
given a bliss shock occurrence. Matches with a higher probability of marriage thus also have a lower
probability of divorce. Conversely, a marriage resulting from an exceptionally large realization of z (love
at first sight) should break faster than a marriage based on solid fundamentals.
4See Fortin (2005) for a study of gender attitudes and labor market outcomes across OECD countries.
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4.2. Preferences and home production
The home production of a household public good q is the channel that can make marriage (or cohab-
itation) preferable to remaining single. Singles have access to a household production technology that
requires domestic time as single input: q = F 0i (d). For married couples, home production depends on the
hours spent on domestic chores by both spouses (dm, df ), and also on spouses’ types (i, j) and a bliss
shock z : q = zF 1ij(dm, df ).5 Two types of complementarities will matter: first, in endogenous time inputs
dm, df ; second, in the particular way exogenous types i, j interact in domestic production. For example,
domestic production may be supermodular (or 2-increasing) with respect to spouses’ education.
Individuals draw utility from private consumption c (the numeraire), private leisure e, and the public
good q. Labor supply is h = 1 − e − d, normalizing to 1 the total amount of time available per week
to any individual. Let R,Rm, Rf denote the budget expenditures allocated to private consumption and
leisure by singles and married males and females. For a single of type i, whose wage is wi, the budget
constraint is
(4.1) c+ wie = wi(1− d) ≡ R.
For a married couple of male-female type (i, j), we allow for intra-household transfers tm, tf , that can be
positive or negative, such that
(4.2) cm + wiem = wi(1− dm)− tm ≡ Rm, cf + wjef = wj(1− df )− tf ≡ Rf .
We also assume that households are subject to a living cost (or benefit) Cij that is a function of exogenous
characteristics but not wages. The household budget is balanced if cm + cf +Cij = wihm +wjhf , which
implies that tm + tf = Cij . We can think of Cij as a fixed cost for operating the home production
technology, or as a proxy for children’s consumption.
Let Ui(c, e, q) denote the utility function of an individual with exogenous characteristics i (or j if
female). For later use, we also define the conditional indirect utility function
(4.3) ψi(R, q, d) = max
c,e
Ui(c, e, q) s.t. c+ wie ≤ R, c ≥ 0, 0 ≤ e ≤ 1− d.
4.3. Marriage contracts
We assume that individuals do not make long term commitments and can walk away from the nego-
tiation at any time. A marriage contract between a male of type i and a female of type j, for a current
match-specific shock z, specifies a utility level for both spouses, um and uf , and two promised values
V 1m(z
′) and V 1f (z
′) for any realization z′ of the next match-specific shock if the match continues. Let V 0i
and V 0j denote the values of being single.
The present values Wm and Wf of a marriage contract to the male and female spouses for any given
choice of (um, uf ) follow the Bellman equation,









where r is the time discount rate. The second term of the right-hand side is the option value of divorce after
a shock to the match-specific component. If a bliss shock z′ accrues, then either the match continuation
value V 1m(z′) is greater than the value of singlehood V 0i and the match continues, or it is lower and there
is a divorce.
5As far as notations are concerned, we index by i and j the variables that are exogenously given, like the wage (wi is
the component of i that is the wage), and we index by m and f the variables of the decision problem.
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Marriage utilities um, uf depend on controls dm, df , tm, tf as
(4.5) um = ψi [wi(1− dm)− tm, q, dm] , uf = ψj [wj(1− df )− tf , q, df ] ,
for q = zF 1ij(dm, df ), and these controls are chosen so as to maximize the Nash bargaining criterion
(4.6)
[
Wm − V 0i
]β [
Wf − V 0j
]1−β
,
subject to the feasibility constraint tm + tf = Cij and the participation constraint
WtM(i, j, z) = 1⇔ V 1m(z)− V 0i ≥ 0 and V 1f (z)− V 0j ≥ 0.
Individuals draw bargaining power both from their outside options (V 0i , V 0j ) and from their bargaining
coefficients β and 1−β. A greater β favors the husband in the allocation of resources, for instance because
he would be more patient. This is the behavioral source of bargaining power in the household. A greater
market value ratio V 0i /V 0j does it also. This is the economic source of that power.
Next, without commitment, the continuation values should align with personal interest. Hence Wm =
V 1m(z) must satisfy the option-value equation,
(4.7) (r + δ)
[
V 1m(z)− V 0i
]





dG(z′)− rV 0i ,
denoting x+ ≡ max{x, 0}, and with a symmetric expression for V 1f (z).6 The equilibrium value of a mar-
riage contract is a function of types i, j and z. We shall use the notation V 1m(i, j, z), V 1f (i, j, z) whenever
necessary.
Lastly, the present value of singlehood satisfies the Bellman equation,




[V 1m(i, j, z)− V 0i ]WtM(i, j, z)nf (j) dG(z) dj,
where u0i = maxd≤1 ψi[wi(1−d), F 0i (d)] and where nf (j) denotes singles’ expectations about type distri-
butions in the future. With anticipated probability λnf (j) a male single of type i meets a female single
of type j. The match-specific bliss shock is z drawn from distribution G. The marriage is consummated
if WtM(i, j, z) = 1; in which case the male individual i enjoys net continuation value V 1m(i, j, z) − V 0i
from the next period onward.
4.4. Steady state
Calculating the value of being single requires forecasting the chance of meeting a partner of any type
in the future. Assuming that the economy is in a steady state easily solves the expectation formation
problem. In steady state, flows in and out of the stocks of married couples of each type must exactly
balance each other out. This means that, for all (i, j),
(4.9) δ (1− αij)m(i, j) = λnm(i)nf (j)αij .
The left-hand side is the flow of divorces. A fraction δ of the m(i, j) married couples draw a new bliss
shock. Divorce occurs with probability one minus the marriage probability αij . The right-hand side is the
flow of new (i, j)-marriages. It has two components: a single male of type i, out of the nm(i) identical ones,
6Notice that the solution to the bargaining problem in c, dm, df , tm, tf is invariant to an affine change of indirect utility
functions (ψi, ψj) into (ai + biψi, aj + bjψj). Utilities um, uf and flow values rV 1m(z), rV 1f (z) are then subject to the same
affine transformations.
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meets a single female of type j with probability λnf (j); the marriage is consummated with probability
αij .
Now, making use of the accounting restrictions,
(4.10) `m(i) = nm(i) +
ˆ
m(i, j) dj, `f (j) = nf (j) +
ˆ
m(i, j) di,
and replacingm(i, j) by its value from (4.9), i.e.m(i, j) = λδ
α(i,j)
1−α(i,j)nm(i)nf (j), the equilibrium measures
















5. EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION WITH TRANSFERABLE UTILITY
In this section we solve the equilibrium under a particular specification of preferences that allows to
simplify the algebra and avoids complicated numerical solving. We assume that the indirect utility is of
the form:




where Ai ≡ Ai(wi) and Bi ≡ Bi(wi) are individual-specific differentiable, increasing and concave func-
tions of the wage wi. We normalize the denominator as Bi(1) = 1. The denominator Bi is an individual-
specific price index and the numerator q(R−Ai) can therefore be interpreted as a nominal utility level.
Note that the right-hand side of equation (5.1) does not depend on d. This means that we implicitly
assume that d is always chosen small enough for the constraint e ≤ 1− d to be never binding. Allowing
for corner solutions already complicates the collective model a lot (see Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac, and
Meghir, 2007). Adding marriage formation would complicate things further. We leave this extension for
future work. Demands then follow from the indirect utility function by application of Roy’s identity:





(R−Ai), c = R− wie.
Under this assumption we show that the equilibrium satisfies the following two properties:
1. Recursivity. Domestic production inputs are determined first, independently of transfers and
values, and transfers and values then follow.
2. Transferability. There exists a match surplus that is shared between spouses, and matching
requires positive surplus.
5.1. Recursivity
Fix transfers and present values to given levels. For this particular specification of preferences the
solution to the Nash bargaining problem with respect to time inputs dm, df comes out to be independent
of these preset transfers and continuation values and can be easily calculated in a first stage.7
The first order conditions of the Nash bargaining problem with respect to domestic production are
1
wi









Rm −Ai +Rf −Aj ,
7See de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet (1991) and Lambert and Magnac (1998) for other examples of recursivity in
modeling the decisions of agricultural households.
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where Rm−Ai+Rf−Aj is net total private expenditure, i.e. what is left of total family income wi+wj to
be spent on private consumption and leisure after spending widm +wjdf + tm + tf on home production,
above and beyond the minimal expenditure Ai +Aj .
These conditions deliver two functions d1m(i, j), d1f (i, j) of observable match characteristics.
8 Let us
write Xij and F 1ij as the equilibrium values of Rm −Ai +Rf −Aj and F 1ij(d1m, d1f ).
5.2. Transferability
In Appendix A we show that the first-order conditions of the Nash bargaining problem with respect
to transfers imply the following rent sharing conditions,
(5.3) Bi
[




V 1f (z)− V 0j
]
= (1− β)Sij(z),
where the match surplus Sij(z) solves




The match surplus is equal to the difference of utility flows in marriage and singlehood, zF 1ijXij−BirV 0i −
BjrV
0





′)+ dG(z′) denote the integrated surplus. Let G(s) ≡ ´ (z − s)+ dG(z). The function
G is decreasing and invertible on the support of G, with G′ = −(1 − G). By integrating equation (5.4)
we obtain that Sij solves










The matching probability becomes


















The first equality results from equation (5.4) and the second one uses equation (5.5). Moreover, equation
(4.8) for the value of singlehood becomes








j + λ(1− β)
ˆ
Sij nm(i) di,
respectively for single men and women.
5.3. Transfers
Knowing present values, we can finally determine equilibrium transfers. We also show in Appendix A
that, because of the lack of commitment, equilibrium transfers tm(i, j, z) and tf (i, j, z) can be obtained
8These demand functions are independent of z because the production function for couples is proportional to z. This is
a simplifying condition that is not essential for separability.
9Note that the function (i, j, z) 7→ qXij = zF 1ijXij is indeed the equilibrium value of aggregate nominal utility Bium +
Bjuf = q
[
wi(1− dm)− tm + wj(1− df )− tf
]
= qXij .
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um − rV 0i
]β [
uf − rV 0j
]1−β
.
That is, since Bium +Bjuf = qXij = zF 1ijXij ,
(5.9) Bium = BirV 0i + β
[
zF 1ijXij −BirV 0i +BjrV 0j
]
.
Alternatively, dividing by q = zF 1ij , we obtain net private incomes as a share of net total private expen-
diture Xij :
Rm −Ai = wi(1− d1m)− tm −Ai = βij(z)Xij ,(5.10)
Rf −Aj = wj(1− d1f )− tf −Aj = [1− βij(z)]Xij ,(5.11)
where the collective sharing rule βij(z) can be derived from equation (5.9) as
(5.12) βij(z) = β +
(1− β)BirV 0i − βBjrV 0j
zF 1ijXij
.
In this model, the share of the household private consumption budget that is allocated to the male spouse
is the sum of the bargaining coefficient β and the market advantage in the marriage market that results
from the relative values of singlehood, BirV 0i , BjrV 0j .
5.4. Equilibrium
The equilibrium is fully characterized by the following functions of individual types, Sij , BirV 0i ,
BjrV
0
j , nm(i), nf (j), αij . They are obtained as a fixed point of the system of equations (4.11), (5.5),
(5.6) and (5.8) for λ ≡ λ(Nm, Nf ) (to be specified) with Nm =
´
nm(i) di and Nf =
´
nf (j) dj. Proving
equilibrium existence is difficult (see Shimer and Smith 2000, Atakan 2006, Lauermann and Nöldeke
2015, Manea 2017) and the equilibrium is likely not unique.
To calculate the equilibrium numerically we discretize the value and density functions on a Chebyshev
grid and we use Clenshaw-Curtis quadrature to approximate the integrals. Then, the equilibrium is
obtained by iterating the fixed-point operator (see Appendix D for details). We tried different choices of
starting values and the algorithm always converged to the same limit.
6. SPECIFICATION, IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION
In this section we describe the parametric specification of the model used in estimation and how the
parameters depend on individual types (wage, gender and other exogenous characteristics). Then, we
study identification and explain the estimation procedure.
6.1. Parametric specification
The way parameters depend on exogenous variables (gender gi, education Edi, wage wi and family
values index FVIi) is specified as follows. Let xi = (Edi,FVIi) denote the vector of exogenous individual
characteristics in addition to wage and gender.
Meeting rates
The meeting function is Cobb-Douglas: λ(Nm, Nf ) = ξ(NmNf )−1/2.
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Preferences
Males’ indirect utility for consumption and leisure is such that





i , lnBi = bi lnwi.
All parameters may depend on xi.10 However, in the estimation, we restrict parameters a0i, a1i and bi
to be linear functions of characteristics xi, and we set a2m constant given gender.
Leisure expenditure follows from equation (5.2) as
(6.2) wiem = a1iwi + a2mw2i + bi(Rm −Ai), Rm = wi(1− dm)− tm,
given domestic time dm and transfer tm (tm = 0 for singles). Consumption is then




i + (1− bi)(Rm −Ai).
For women we obtain similar expressions with j and f in place of i and m.
Domestic production
The domestic production functions are Stone-Geary:
[couples] F 1ij(dm, df ) = Zij
(
dm −D1i
)K1m (df −D1j )K1f ,(6.4)
[singles] F 0i (dm) = (dm −D0i )K
0
m , F 0j (df ) = (df −D0j )K
0
f ,(6.5)
Note the absence of TFP parameter in front of the home production for singles. This is a normalization
that is rendered necessary by the ordinal nature of preferences (see footnote 6). The TFP parameter
Zij measures the quality of the public good that is produced in the household and subsumes all comple-
mentarities with respect to exogenous male and female types in domestic production. The Stone-Geary
specification forces complementarity between time inputs and K1m = K1f → 0 corresponds to a Leontieff
technology with dm = D0i , df = D0j . Given the limited variability of non-market time uses across calendar
time and types, we thought that a small departure from Leontieff would not be a bad assumption. But
more work is needed to test alternative specifications (such as CES).
We let the Di and Dj parameters be general functions of characteristics xi, xj . Moreover, Cij and Zij
are functions of both spouses’ characteristics xi, xj . In the estimation, to make type complementarities
easier to interpret, we will let Cij be linear in xi and xj , with no interaction terms between xi and xj .
The times used in home production are therefore, for singles,





























with net total private expenditure being
(6.8) Xij =





10The consumption good is the numeraire. With a non-unitary price p for c, A and B become A = a0p+a1w+ 12a2w
2/p
and lnB = b lnw + (1− b) ln p. Concavity of the cost function implies a2 < 0.
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The equilibrium domestic productions are, for singles,




























This specification is quite flexible. Suppose that some exogenous factor increasesD1j (say family values).
Then the wife will increase her non-market hours and the husband will reduce his own input to home
production (because of the induced decrease ofXij). Minimal inputsD1i , D1j thus govern home-production
specialization. At the same time, domestic output F 1ij should fall following the decrease of Xij . It is
therefore important to allow the factors determining minimal inputs to determine public good quality
Zij or living cost Cij at the same time in order to decouple the level of home production from the division
of labor in home production.
Lastly, the distribution of match-specific shocks z is assumed to be log-normal: G(z) = Φ(ln z/σ),
where Φ is the standard normal CDF and σ is the standard deviation of z. We assume a zero mean as
any non-zero would be absorbed into Zij . We then have
G(s) =
ˆ















The details of the identification proof are relegated to Appendix B. We assume that we observe the time
uses, marital status and characteristics of the whole population of men and women over a fixed period
of time in which the economy is in a steady state (i.e. the distributions remain fixed over time because
divorces offset new marriages). Although identification may hold under far less restrictive assumptions,
we only discuss identification under the preceding parametric restrictions.
We first show that rates λ and δ determining dating and divorce risk, and the conditional matching
probability αij are identified from marriage and divorce flows given couples’ types. The main source of
identification here is that a common factor, the bliss shock z, is determining both marriage and divorce:
λαij is the marriage rate and δ(1− αij) is the divorce rate.
Then, we show that the parameters of preferences and home production are identified in much the same
way as in standard labor supply models, the other spouse’s earnings acting as a source of non-earned
income allowing to identify income effects. For this to work, we need the sharing rule to exhibit residual
variation conditional on spouses’ socio-demographic characteristics and wages. This additional source of
variation is the match-specific bliss variable z unobserved to the econometrician. One can then identify
bm/bf by regressing wie1m on wje1f , keeping wages and socio-demographics constant.
This is yet not enough to guaranty the identification of preference and home production parameters.
Time uses must exhibit sufficient nonlinear variation in wages, in particular to separately identify bm
from bf . It is thus required that the demand system be not linear in wages (a2m 6= 0 and a2f 6= 0) and
that home-production time uses not remain constant as wages vary (K1m +K1f 66= 0).
Third, the bargaining parameter β and the variance of match-specific shocks are identified from the
first and second-order moments of married couples’ leisure demands. Intuitively, β sets the level of the
sharing rule βij(z) and z its dispersion given observed match types.
Lastly, the public good quality parameter Zij is identified from the structural link between public good
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quality and matching probability.
6.3. Estimation strategy
We use household data on time uses, gender, wages, family values and education covering the period
1991-2008. We drop all individual observations corresponding to young individuals aged less than 22
and older individuals aged more than 50.11 We split the whole sample into 6 three-year periods: 91-93,
94-96, 97-99, 00-02, 03-05, 06-08. We assume that each subsample is a draw from a steady-state economy
characterized by different distributions of male and female types. By contrast, structural parameters are
assumed to remain the same throughout the entire observation period. That is, we expect the model to
fit the data both in cross sections and across time.
The index i now refers to an observation unit of the sample of male singles, j refers to female singles,
and (i, j) refers to couples. For singles, we observe domestic time use d0i , labor supply h0i , and education
Edi ∈ {L,M,H} (O-level, A-level and higher education), wages wi and family values indices FVIi. For
couples, the corresponding time use observations are d1mij , d1fij , h
1
mij and h1fij . Leisure is deduced as
e = 1− d− h. The estimation procedure is iterative and goes through the following steps.
Step 1: Reduced-form estimation of meetings rates and matching probabilities
For each sub-period, pooling the three cross-sections, we compute kernel density estimates of nm(i),
nf (j) and m(i, j) from the stocks of male singles, female singles and married couples on a grid of values
for i and j comprising three education categories, 16 Chebyshev nodes for wages and 8 Chebyshev
nodes for the family values index (see Appendix D).12 We then calculate marriage and divorce flows
MF (i, j), DF (i, j) by education only because of the small sample sizes of flows. For example, we calculate
the number of new marriages for 1994 as the number of singles in 1994 who are married in 1995, and the
flow of divorces for 1994 as the number of singles in 1994 who were married in 1993. Then we add the
numbers for 1994, 1995 and 1996 to get the aggregate flows for the period 1994-1996.
The number of new marriages (or cohabitations) of type (i, j) per unit of time is linked to λ and αij
by the relation:
(6.11) MF(i, j) = λnm(i)nf (j)αij .
Divorce occurs when the last draw of z (occurring at rate δ) ceases to satisfy the matching rule (with
probability 1− αij). It follows that the flow of divorces per unit of time is
(6.12) DF (i, j) = m(i, j) δ (1− αij).
Define MR(i, j) ≡ MF (i,j)nm(i)nf (j) , the marriage rate (by potential match type), and DR(i, j) ≡
DF (i,j)
m(i,j) , the







Using equation (6.13) and the Cobb-Douglas specification of the meeting rate λ = ξ(NmNf )−1/2,
we estimate 1/ξ and 1/δ by OLS, pooling all four intermediate sub-periods 94-96, 97-99, 00-02, 03-
05 together and eliminating the two extreme periods (91-93 and 06-08) to avoid boundary problems
11We experimented with narrower age ranges without changing the results substantially.
12The fact that the same individuals may be present in different periods does not matter under the assumption that
the distribution of the first year data is the same as the one in the second year, etc. Kernel density estimators as well as
Least Squares only require the application of the Law of Large Numbers for consistency. Correlations between observations
matter yet for asymptotic standard errors.
MARRIAGE, LABOR SUPPLY, AND HOME PRODUCTION 19





















Notes: 1) To make this graph, we calculated marriage and divorce flows by education (3 categories) and FVI
(2 categories: above or below the median FVI ), and we considered 4-year subperiods (92-95, 96-99, 00-03,
04-07). We obtain 3× 3× 2× 2× 4 = 144 points. 2) The regression line is obtained by regressing DF (i, j) on
MF (i, j), weighting each point (i, j) by their sample representativeness, measured as `m(i) `f (j).
Figure 6: Link between new marriages and divorces by periods and match types
(no divorce flow can be calculated in 1991 and no marriage flow in 2008).13 We use this approach to
estimating rates instead of a duration model because of censoring (right-censoring for marriage and left-
and right-censoring for singlehood).
Then we could estimate a different matching probability αij for each sub-period using flows. However,
the model assumes that households anticipate steady-state equilibrium distributions. If we impose equal
inflows and outflows, MF (i, j) = DF (i, j), matching probabilities follow from equation (4.9) as
(6.14) αij =
δ m(i, j)
δ m(i, j) + λnm(i)nf (j)
.
Equation (6.14) is not only consistent with the way households are supposed to form expectations, it
also makes the estimation of matching probabilities much more precise as stock samples are much bigger
than flow samples.14 Figure 6 displays the empirical link between marriage and divorce flows MF (i, j)
and DF (i, j). There is clearly a lot of noise and the regression line is a bit off the 45 degree line. But
there is no clear structure that would indicate that equation (6.14) is not a good approximation of the
true marriage probability.
Step 2: Preferences, home production, bargaining power and bliss shock distribution
We then estimate the parameters of preferences and domestic productions, as well as the Nash bar-
gaining parameter β and match dispersion σ, by nonlinear least squares, with time uses as dependent
variables and wages, education and FVI s as observed regressors. The model allows to calculate all the
relevant conditional expectations, unfortunately not in closed form. The bliss shock must be integrated
out, and the sharing rule, the matching probabilities and the distributions of individual types by gender
and marital status must be recalculated at each new parameter iteration. The formulas for the residuals
13Note also that running the regression with or without weighting observations (i, j) by their sample size `m(i) `f (j)
gives close estimates.
14Estimates of 1/λ and 1/δ rely on flows; there is no other way. But they are more precisely estimated than matching
probabilities because the regression procedure averages over types (i, j), which smoothes out small sample errors.
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are provided in Appendix C, and the numerical techniques used to approximate them are exposited in
Appendix D.
Note that we could plug the pre-estimated distributions of types and the matching probabilities in the
residuals instead of using the model to calculate them. However, when we proceed to the counterfactual
analyses, we have to predict the distributions and marriage probabilities. The benchmark economy is the
one that is predicted using the estimated parameters. It thus seems preferable that we try to estimate
the parameters by fitting the benchmark economy to the data.
Step 3: Public good quality
Public good quality Zij is estimated as a flexible high-order polynomial in xi, xj , allowing for all
interactions. That is, we invert the theoretical link between Zij and matching probabilities αij . This is
a standard minimum distance procedure based on consistent estimates of matching probabilities. See
Appendix C for details.
7. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first describe parameter estimates and the fit. Then we discuss the implied sharing
rule. We end the section by a counterfactual analysis.
7.1. Parameter estimates and fit
Meeting rates
We estimate ξ = 0.151 and nearly identical meeting rates for singles (λNm = ξ(Nm/Nf )1/2 is close
to λNf = ξ(Nf/Nm)1/2 as Nm ' Nf ). This implies a median duration between two consecutive datings
of about 4.5 years and a first quartile of 10 to 11 months. We estimate the yearly probability of a bliss
shock to be δ = 0.0378, or a median duration between two consecutive shocks of 18 years (first quartile:
7 to 8 years). This may seem a long time between datings and bliss shocks but remember that we select
only labor-active individuals.15
Unconstrained marriage probabilities
We start with the marriage probabilities estimated using equation (6.14). These estimates only rely
on flows and stocks, and not on the economic mechanism determining values. Table II displays mean
matching probabilities by education, FVI and wages quartiles for three periods. We shall refer to these
estimates of matching probabilities as the unconstrained, or actual, ones. The first observation is that the
sorting patterns are very stable. Secondly, the sorting patterns are quite different by education, family
values or wages. Yet, all three patterns express different forms of positive assortative mating.
The matching probability matrix for education is symmetric with a strong main diagonal. This is the
usual form of homophily. The matching probability matrix for FVI is also symmetric, but with diagonal
elements that are not all dominant. The Q1 row and the Q1 columns are identical, with nearly identical
entries. This means that liberal individuals are rather indifferent to the family values of their partner. On
the other end, the Q4 row and the Q4 column are also similar, but with decreasing entries. Conservative
individuals value conservative partners.
For wages it is yet again different. There is no symmetry. The female wage does not seem to matter
much for matching (though richer women marry richer men more often). The male wage comparatively
15There is a bit of attrition across time in the panel. If we keep in the stocks only singles who are still in the panel the
following year, and couples who were already there the year before, we estimate ξ = 0.163 and δ = 0.0391. The results are
not substantially affected. We also investigated a more general specification with a different distribution G0 for the first
bliss shock and another distribution G1 for the shocks during marriage. The results were not fundamentally altered.
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TABLE II
Sorting by education and wages
Female
1991-1993 2000-2002 2006-2008
<HS HS >HS <HS HS >HS <HS HS >HS
M
al
e <HS 0.49 0.31 0.21 0.49 0.42 0.23 0.47 0.46 0.26
HS 0.34 0.35 0.23 0.41 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.47 0.32








Q4 0.51 0.49 0.41 0.30 0.59 0.47 0.42 0.31 0.58 0.49 0.46 0.36
Q3 0.50 0.48 0.42 0.32 0.49 0.44 0.41 0.34 0.49 0.46 0.44 0.36
Q2 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.35 0.45 0.42 0.40 0.35 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.36








Q4 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.42 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.44 0.59 0.55 0.52 0.44
Q3 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.39 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.45 0.51 0.49 0.47 0.40
Q2 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.35
Q1 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.27
(c) By wage quartile
Notes: This table displays the estimated unconstrained marriage probabilities αij separately
projected on male-female educations, FVI s and wages. Q1 denotes the interval below the first
quartile, Q2 between first and second quartile, etc.
matters a lot; males with a high wage (in the Q4 interval) marry twice more frequently than males with
a low wage (Q1).
This is interesting in relation to the social norm discussed by Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015).
The solid line in Figure 7 plots the estimated matching probability αij as a function of the female wage
ratio ( wfwm+wf ). The matching probability is decreasing with the female wage ratio for values of this ratio
above 0.5, whereas it is more or less constant for values less than 0.5. However, matching probability
estimates indicate that this is likely because low-wage males are just not attractive in general, and not
because of a social norm preventing marriages with the husband earning less than the wife.
The strong, symmetric homophily with respect to education explains why married women’s educa-
tional attainment has so much increased over the last 25 years and why the gender-and-marriage gap in
education has disappeared. The particular form of matching with respect to wages also explains why the
marriage gap is more pronounced for men than for women.
Marriage probabilities explain sorting, which explains selection by gender, type and marital status.
We now have to understand how matching probabilities relate to preferences and home production.
Preferences and home production estimates
Preference and home production parameter estimates are displayed in Table III. The impact of ed-
ucation on preferences and home production (a, b,D) is similar for men and women. More educated
individuals value consumption more than leisure (parameter a0). Education also increases the income
effect for leisure (parameter b). There is little effect of education on home production specialization (pa-
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Wife share of aggregate wage























Figure 7: Matching probability by female wage ratio (1991-2008 mean)
rameters D1m, D1f ). Education increases the living cost C: more educated individuals spend more on
the public good.
Family values, on the contrary, have little influence on preferences. The only significant parameter is
a1f [FVI]: conservative females supply less market work; but even for FVI = 5 the effect is lower than
0.1 hours. However, family values determine home production quite differently for men and women.
Conservative women demand more leisure (parameter a1f ) and home production time (D
0,1
f ), while
conservative men, when married, want to spend less time in home production (D1m). The living cost C is
also higher for liberal couples, which could mean that liberal couples prefer to buy home services instead
of doing the work themselves.
There is thus a correlation between family attitudes, as they can be measured by the questionnaire,
and task specialization, some individuals being more prone than others to adopt the traditional family
model, where the wife specializes in home-production and the husband in market work.
Public good quality, sorting and complementarities
The standard deviation of the logged bliss shock is estimated at 0.268 (with a standard error of 0.111),
which is far from negligible. It moves home production in a [−41%,+69%] interval around its equilibrium
value F 1ij with 95% probability.
Next, we look at how the model fits marriage probabilities. Given parameters, we predict marriage
probabilities as indicated in Section 5 and compare them with the unconstrained matching probabilities.
In Table IV we calculate the measure of fit: R2 = 1−Var(αij − α̂ij)/Var(αij), where αij and α̂ij denote
unconstrained and predicted matching probabilities. We obtain a R2 close to 80% in all years, meaning
that a fixed set of structural parameters for the whole period costs 20% in prediction error. Figure 7
(dotted line) shows that the model fits matching probabilities by female wage ratio well.
Table IV also shows the fit obtained with the quadratic projection of the nonparametric estimates
of lnZij . By using the quadratic approximation the fit is reduced by about 7 percentage points. This
shows that high-order polynomial terms could be neglected. Then we predict marriage probabilities with
a quadratic projection of Zij without male-female interaction terms. This reduces the fit by 33%. So
gender complementarities matter. Interestingly, only one complementarity really does matter: education
homophily. Moreover, despite important changes in women’s educational attainment since the early
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TABLE III
Estimated preference and home-production parameters
Preferences Home production, singles
a0f [Ed = L] -21.46 (7.80) D0f [Ed = L] 0.0524 (0.0177)
a0m[Ed = L] -26.63 (8.09) D0m[Ed = L] 0.0467 (0.0188)
a0f [Ed = H] -12.74 (5.01) D0m[Ed = H] 0.0481 (0.0142)
a0m[Ed = H] -13.58 (5.50) D0f [Ed = H] 0.0363 (0.0142)
a0f [FVI] 0.7455 (0.7355) D0f [FVI] 0.0096 (0.0041)
a0m[FVI] 0.6168 (0.6101) D0m[FVI] 0.0031 (0.0039)
a1f [Ed = L] 0.4403 (0.0175) K0f 0.0177 (0.0070)
a1m[Ed = L] 0.3939 (0.0197) K0m 0.0002 (0.0034)
a1f [Ed = H] 0.4350 (0.0215)
a1m[Ed = H] 0.3812 (0.0258) Home production, couples
a1f [FVI] 0.0184 (0.0046) D1f [Ed = L] 0.0701 (0.0105)
a1m[FVI] -0.0001 (0.0050) D1m[Ed = L] 0.0660 (0.0095)
D1f [Ed = H] 0.0564 (0.0094)
a2f -0.0031 (0.0007) D1m[Ed = H] 0.0708 (0.0085)
a2m -0.0008 (0.0005) D1f [FVI] 0.0159 (0.0029)
D1m[FVI] -0.0073 (0.0025)
bf [Ed = L] 0.0303 (0.0119)
bm[Ed = L] 0.0345 (0.0122) C[constant] 37.14 (10.05)
bf [Ed = H] 0.0721 (0.0248) C[FVIf ] -1.251 (0.787)
bm[Ed = H] 0.0940 (0.0340) C[FVIm] -3.896 (1.180)
bf [FVI] -0.0023 (0.0020) C[Edf = L] -4.023 (2.328)
bm[FVI] -0.0000 (0.0021) C[Edm = L] -9.105 (3.742)
K1f 0.0183 (0.0038)
K1m 0.0056 (0.0026)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Ed = H indicates “high-school graduate” and Ed = L
indicates an education level that is less than A-level.
1990s, the strength of education homophily does not seem to vary over time in any specific way.16
Fit of selection and time uses
We next show how our model fits selection, i.e. the dynamics of wages and individual types by marital
status. We take the changes in the distributions of wages, family values and education by gender as given
and we simulate different steady state equilibria for the 6 time periods, keeping the model parameters
fixed.
We first note that the difference between the actual number of married couples and its prediction is
never greater than 4%, and the errors on the number of singles are correspondingly small. Then the
first two rows of Figure 8 show how the model fits selection. The wages of married men are slightly
overestimated and the wages of single men are slightly underestimated. Yet the different marriage wage
gaps (married vs single) of men and women are well replicated by the model. The fit of family values
indices and education by marital status over time is very good. The last row of Figure 8 shows the fit of
time use trends. The trends in the market hours of married and single women are slightly overestimated,
the model predicting a bit more change for women than is actually observed. The marriage differentials
of market and non market hours are very well fitted.
Lastly, Figure 9 shows how the model fits the distributions of wage and earnings ratios (within couples)
for the middle period 2000-2002, first for all couples, then for conservative couples (both spouses’ FVI s
below their medians), and finally for liberal couples (FVI s above medians). The fit is a bit worse for
16We also find that Zij depends very little on wages in general, as we would expect. However, Zij does depend on family
values, although not much on interacted family values.
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Figure 8: Fit of hours and selection
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(1) Wage ratio, wfwf+wm (2) Labor earnings ratio,
wfhf
wfhf+wmhm
Wife share of aggregate wage
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(b) Conservative wives and husbands
Wife share of aggregate wage
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(c) Liberal wives and husbands
Figure 9: Fit of the distributions of wages and earnings ratios, 2000-2002
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TABLE IV
Fit of matching probabilities (R2 of regression of unconstrained on predicted αij)
1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 Mean
Nonparametric estimation of Zij 0.72 0.83 0.86 0.87 0.82 0.78 0.81
Quadratic projection of lnZij 0.68 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.75 0.72 0.75
Quadratic projection of lnZij 0.38 0.51 0.60 0.62 0.57 0.53 0.54without interactions
Quadratic projection of lnZij with no interactions but...
wm ∗ wf 0.43 0.54 0.63 0.65 0.59 0.56 0.57
FVIm ∗ FVIf 0.37 0.51 0.61 0.63 0.57 0.54 0.54
Edm ∗ Edf 0.66 0.72 0.76 0.75 0.69 0.67 0.71
wm ∗ Edf 0.43 0.55 0.64 0.66 0.61 0.57 0.58
wf ∗ Edm 0.53 0.61 0.68 0.67 0.63 0.58 0.62
wm ∗ FVIf 0.38 0.51 0.60 0.62 0.57 0.54 0.54
wf ∗ FVIm 0.38 0.51 0.60 0.62 0.57 0.54 0.54
FVIf ∗ Edm 0.38 0.51 0.60 0.62 0.57 0.54 0.54
FVIm ∗ Edf 0.37 0.52 0.60 0.63 0.59 0.55 0.54
wages than for labor earnings but the model reproduces the observed patterns well, both overall and by
family values.
7.2. The sharing rule
We estimate the bargaining power parameter β to be 0.45 with a standard deviation of 0.10. However
this does not imply that men get less than half of the surplus. The share of the surplus that each spouse
reclaims also depends on his/her outside option. The sharing rule βij(z), i.e. the share of the net total
private expenditure Xij that is appropriated by the husband, is a better indicator of market power.
Its estimated mean value across all couples’ types is remarkably stable—between 0.55 and 0.56 through-
out the whole period. Hence, better outside options compensate for a bargaining coefficient that is es-
timated slightly less than 0.5 and give the husband a share of the rent slightly bigger than 0.5. The
division of labor in the family is gender-specific; nevertheless, the total income that is left for private
consumption and leisure is split between spouses in a way that is quite egalitarian.
In Figure 10 we show the evolution of the sharing rule over the period, separately for various household
types. There is evidence of compensating differentials in education. The husband gets a bigger share of
the rent if he is less educated and if the wife is more educated. Note however that educated females always
get less than the fair share. The only case where the wife gets more than the husband is for uneducated
females married to educated males. Family values have little effect on income sharing. They affect work
in household but not private income sharing. There are no compensating differentials in wages. Figure
10d summarizes the effect of within-household wage inequality on income sharing. The share of income
that is appropriated by one spouse is higher if his/her wage ratio is higher. Moreover, this link is getting
stronger over time. Hence, a consequence of the (slow) cultural change away from the traditional model
of the family may be that there is progressively less redistribution between spouses.
7.3. Counterfactual changes
Wage elasticities
In the first counterfactual analysis, we increase all wages in the 2000-02 sample by 10%, separately for
men and women, and simulate changes in market and non market hours.17 We first run the simulations
17We use this sample because it is in the middle of the period. It is also one of the biggest subsamples and by being
away from the borders the moving averages of wages and hours are more accurate.
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Figure 10: Mean sharing rule by type
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TABLE V
Wage elasticities













Married Men 42.99 42.49 43.02 1.3% 42.44 -0.1% 43.03 1.3% 42.39 -0.2%
Single Men 37.48 36.83 37.78 2.6% 36.78 -0.1% 37.70 2.4% 36.78 -0.1%
Married Women 25.86 26.63 26.46 -0.7% 27.64 3.8% 26.32 -1.2% 27.58 3.5%
Single Women 30.07 29.56 29.48 -0.3% 30.68 3.8% 29.89 1.1% 30.96 4.7%
Home production time
Married Men 5.13 5.33 5.25 -1.5% 5.34 0.3% 5.24 -1.6% 5.35 0.4%
Single Men 5.00 5.04 5.04 -0.1% 5.04 0.0% 5.03 -0.2% 5.03 -0.1%
Married Women 14.99 15.52 15.64 0.8% 15.08 -2.9% 15.72 1.3% 15.11 -2.7%
Single Women 10.00 10.01 10.04 0.3% 9.73 -2.8% 9.88 -1.3% 9.61 -4.0%
Population
# single men 1416 1468 1384 -5.7% 1466 -0.1%
# single women 1452 1509 1458 -3.4% 1495 -0.9%
# couples 3802 3745 3814 1.8% 3753 0.2%
with unchanged distributions of types by gender and marital status. Then, we simulate the new equilib-
rium including distributional changes. The results on hours are reported in Table V. The first column
displays the actual numbers. The second column displays the baseline simulation with the estimated
parameters.
Estimates of uncompensated or Marshallian elasticities vary a lot across publications (see Blundell and
Macurdy, 1999, Meghir and Phillips, 2010). Our estimates of female own-wage labor supply elasticities
(0.38 for married and single women) are similar to the ones of Blundell, Dias, Meghir, and Shaw (2016).
They estimate an elasticity of participation rates (extensive margin) equal to 0.47 and an elasticity of
hours worked (intensive margin) equal to 0.22.
Female own-wage elasticities are more than twice as large as male own-wage elasticities. Cross-wage
elasticities are moderate, although women respond to a rise in husband wage by reducing their market
hours and by increasing their non market hours. The elasticities of home production hours are similar in
absolute value to labor supply elasticities.
Finally, the general equilibrium effects of a change in female wage on hours are small because female
wage is not a strong determinant of matching. A wage rise however renders males more attractive in
the marriage market; there are more marriages and increased specialization in paid work for men and
housework for women.
The determinants of the gender labor supply gap
We then proceed to the simulation of structural changes to the economy so as to better understand the
forces driving the gender differences in labor supply. First, we remove the gender wage gap conditional
on education and family values. Specifically, we multiply each female wage wj by expxj(γm − γf ),
where γm, γf denote the regression coefficients of the regressions of log wages on education and FVI
separately for men and women. Second, we keep the distribution of characteristics fixed and give all
females in the sample the preferences of males with the same characteristics. Third, we do the same for
home production (same home production functions for male and female individuals; same coefficients for
men and women in the home production for couples). Lastly, we consider an economy with only liberal
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TABLE VI
Counterfactual simulations
Actual Baseline (1) No wage (2) Same (3) Same domestic (4) FVI = 1
2000-02 sim. gap preferences production for all
Labor supply
Married Men 42.99 42.49 42.37 -0.3% 41.77 -1.7% 42.55 0.2% 43.24 1.8%
Single Men 37.48 36.83 36.71 -0.3% 36.87 0.1% 36.78 -0.1% 36.49 -0.9%
Married Women 25.86 26.63 29.27 9.9% 28.66 7.6% 35.77 34.3% 34.53 29.6%
Single Women 30.07 29.56 32.29 9.3% 30.00 1.5% 34.46 16.6% 30.64 3.7%
Home production time
Married Men 5.13 5.33 5.37 0.8% 5.56 4.3% 5.35 0.5% 6.26 17.5%
Single Men 5.00 5.04 5.04 -0.1% 5.06 0.3% 5.04 0.1% 4.54 -9.8%
Married Women 14.99 15.52 14.35 -7.5% 16.45 6.0% 6.10 -60.7% 11.45 -26.2%
Single Women 10.00 10.01 9.30 -7.1% 10.63 6.2% 4.90 -51.0% 9.23 -7.8%
Population
# single men 1416 1468 1475 0.5% 1258 -14.3% 1418 -3.4% 1586 8.0%
# single women 1452 1509 1498 -0.7% 1305 -13.5% 1457 -3.4% 1633 8.2%
# couples 3802 3745 3747 0.1% 3943 5.3% 3786 1.1% 3627 -3.2%
Notes: In simulation (1) (no gender wage gap) we replace each female wage wj by wj × exj(γm−γf ). In simulation
(2) (same preferences for men and women) we give females the preferences of males. In simulation (3) (same
domestic production for men and women) we give females the domestic production parameters of males. In
simulation (4) we make every man and woman in the sample liberal (FVI = 1). All percentage changes are with
respect to baseline simulation.
individuals (FVI = 1).
Table VI displays the results. First, wage equalization has very little demographic effects. This is
because matching is essentially independent of female wages. Female market hours increase by about
2h40 (10%) and non-market hours are reduced by 1h10 (7.5%) irrespective of marital status. The effect
on male hours is negligible. Second, preference equalization has moderate effects on time uses. Women
increase labor supply and work in home by about 7% (+2h and +1h). The number of singles falls by
about 14%, which is the biggest counterfactual demographic effect. Third, removing female comparative
advantage in home production goes a long way toward removing all differences in time uses between men
and women (+9h market and non market). The number of singles is also reduced but much less than in
the preceding case.
Fourth and finally, changing attitudes also has dramatic effects. The number of singles increases, and
married women massively substitute paid work to house work (+8h and -4h). Married men increase the
number of hours devoted to home production by about one hour per week. Figures 11 and 12 show the
effect of the last two counterfactuals on wage and earnings ratios. Making everybody liberal comes out
to be quantitatively equivalent to removing females’ comparative advantage in home production.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we build a model of marriage formation and within-household allocation of resources. By
endogenizing marriage formation, we endogenize the sharing rule and its link to distribution factors. The
model allows to explain how exogenous changes to wages, education and family attitudes are transmitted
to labor supply and home-production time inputs. An important innovation of our work is that, in
addition to standard wage and education characteristics, we condition behavior by an index of family
values.
Family values are an important factor of gender identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). They definitely
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(b) Conservative wives and husbands
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(c) Liberal wives and husbands
Figure 11: Counterfactual distributions of wages and earnings ratios, 2000-2002 – No female home pro-
duction advantage
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Figure 12: Counterfactual distributions of wages and earnings ratios, 2000-2002 – All liberal
shape the way labor supply or work in the household vary by gender. Whereas Bertrand, Kamenica, and
Pan (2015) show that gender differences in labor supply or marriage duration cannot be explained without
advocating some strong and slow-changing gender identity norm, we demonstrate that this norm is not
uniformly shared by all individuals and households. The most liberal households behave very differently
from the most conservative ones. Our structural model allows us to simulate a counterfactual economy
where everybody would be liberal. The marriage rate would decline and married women would increase
labor market participation very substantially. A two-hour difference remains that can be explained by
the gender wage gap.
In future work it will be interesting to explore further classic topics in family economics, such as fertility
and child rearing, divorce laws, the evaluation of family tax credits, etc. In addition, our description of
matching can and should be improved by introducing aging and other aspects of the life cycle in the
analysis. Allowing for other types of shocks and uncertainty than the bliss shock, such as wage and
unemployment shocks, is also important. More generally, our framework should be extended to better
understand the link between marriage and labor markets. For example, women who specialize in home
production may be losing human capital.
APPENDIX A: EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION WITH TRANSFERABLE UTILITY
Match surplus




Wm − V 0i
]β [
Wf − V 0j
]1−β
subject to tm + tf = Cij , where
(r + δ)
[
Wm − V 0i
]





dG(z′)− rV 0i ≡ um + vm (say),
(r + δ)
[
Wf − V 0j
]





dG(z′)− rV 0j ≡ uf + vf ,
with
um = q
wi(1− dm)− tm −Ai
Bi
, uf = q
wj(1− df )− tf −Aj
Bj
, q = zF 1ij(dm, df ),
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The first-order conditions for transfers tm, tf ,
β























(r + δ)Sij(z) = Bi(um + vm) +Bj(uf + vf ) = Bi(um + vm) +Bj(uf + vf )− qCij ,























= wi(1− dm)−Ai + wj(1− df )−Aj − Cij ,
for elasticities m =
∂ lnF1ij(dm,df )
∂ ln dm
, f . The optimal home-production inputs dm, df and home-production output
q are thus simple functions of match characteristics. Let Xij be the equilibrium value of wi(1 − dm) − Ai +
wj(1 − df ) − Aj − Cij obtained from the above first-order conditions. Because home production depends on z
multiplicatively, q = zF 1ij , dm, df ), Xij only depends on i, j but not on z.
Continuation values
Making use of the promise keeping constraints, Wm = V 1m(z), we have
V 1m(z)− V 0i = um + vm = β Sij(z)
Bi
,(A.1)









dG(z′)− rV 0i = δβ Sij
Bi






dG(z′)− rV 0j = δ(1− β)Sij
Bj





(r + δ)Sij(z) = Bi(um − rV 0i ) +Bj(uf − rV 0j )− qCij + δSij .
Thus Sij(z) solves the integral equation
(A.3) (r + δ)Sij(z) = qXij −BirV 0i −BjrV 0j + δSij ,
as
Bium +Bjuf = Bium +Bjuf − qCij = qXij = zF 1ijXij .
Transfers
Transfers follow from the above rent sharing equations (equations (A.1) and (A.2)). Indeed, using equation
(A.3),
Bium = β(r + δ)Sij(z)−Bivm = β
[






(A.4) q [wi(1− dm)− tm −Ai] = BirV 0i + β
[
qXij −BirV 0i −BjrV 0j
]
,
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with a similar expression for tf . Note that we can then write
wi(1− dm)− tm −Ai = βij(z)Xij , wj(1− df )− tf −Aj = [1− βij(z)]Xij ,
for βij(z) = β +
BirV
0




It remains to work out the value for singles, i.e.

















+dG(z) denote the integrated surplus. The following fixed-point equation thus defines Sij :










with G(s) ≡ ´ (z−s)+ dG(z) = ´ +∞
s














j + λ(1− β)
ˆ
Sijnm(i) di.
Then Sij(z) follows from solving equation (A.6) after substitution of the values for singles.
APPENDIX B: IDENTIFICATION
In this appendix, we develop the identification arguments in the text.
Step 1: Meetings and matching probability
The number of new marriages (or cohabitations) of type (i, j) per unit of time is
(B.1) MF(i, j) = λnm(i)nf (j)αij .
We observe the flows MF (i, j) and the stocks nm(i), nf (j). We are thus faced with the usual inference problem
of disentangling λ from αij , the meeting rate from the matching probability.
The solution lies in the common mechanism linking marriage and divorce flows. Divorce occurs when the last
draw of z (occurring at rate δ) ceases to satisfy the matching rule (with probability 1− αij). It follows that the
flow of divorces per unit of time is
(B.2) DF (i, j) = m(i, j) δ (1− αij).
Define MR(i, j) ≡ MF (i,j)
nm(i)nf (j)
, the marriage rate (by potential match type), and DR(i, j) ≡ DF (i,j)
m(i,j)
, the divorce







Under the assumption that αij is not a constant independent of couple characteristics, thenMR(i, j) and DR(i, j)
are not collinear and this equation identifies 1/λ and 1/δ. Then, αij follows as
(B.4) αij =
δMR(i, j)
δMR(i, j) + λDR(i, j)
.
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Step 2: Preferences and home production
Fix socio-demographics (xi, xj). Given xi, xj all parameters are thus only gender-specific or constant. All
remaining variation is due to wages (wi, wj).
Claim 1. The match-specific source of variation in the sharing rule βij(z), namely z, allows to identify bm/bf
by regressing wie1m on wje1f , keeping wages constant.
Proof: Consider married couples. The leisure expenditures of husband and wife are
wie
1
m = a1mwi + a2mw
2
i + bmβij(z)Xij ,(B.5)
wje
1
f = a1fwj + a2fw
2
j + bf [1− βij(z)]Xij ,(B.6)
with
(B.7) Xij =





The sharing rule βij(z) is a function of wages wi, wj and z given observed spouse types xi and xj . Eliminating


















This equation implies that conditional on all observable characteristics and wages, the right hand side of this
equation is constant and residual variation with respect to z in leisure expenditures identifies bm/bf . Q.E.D.
Claim 2. Parameters a2m, a2f , bm, bf ,K1m,K1f , a1m, a1f , D1m, D1f are identified from the nonlinear link between











f , a2m and a2f 6= 0.
Proof: Consider domestic time expenditures:


























= D1m + k
1








= k1m(1−D1f − a1f − a2fwj).(B.11)
The variation of these derivatives with respect to wages identifies k1ma2m and k1ma2f . By symmetry, k1fa2m and




















= a1m + 2a2mwi + bm
∂Xij
∂wi
= a1m + 2a2mwi + bm









a2m, denoting k1 = k1m + k1f . By symmetry, i.e. differentiating with respect to
the other wage,
[
2− bf (1− k1)
]





a2m and ym = k1a2m, with symmetric notations for xf , yf . Let t = bm/bf . Knowing
bm/bf , k1ma2m, k1ma2f and k1fa2m, k
1
fa2f , if ym and yf 6= 0, we have k1 = 2(1−t)xm/ym−2xf/yf . Then a2m and bm follow.
For ym and yf to be different from 0 it is required that a2m, a2f , k1 6= 0. The demand system must not be
linear and home-production time uses must respond to wages. Under this condition, k1m, k1f , a2m, a2f , bm, bf are
identified.
Next, the intercept of ∂wjd1j/∂wi identifies 1−D1m−a1m (equation (B.11)); ∂wid1m/∂wi identifiesD1m (equation
(B.10)); ∂(wie1m + bmbf wje
1
f )/∂wi identifies a1m. A symmetric argument applies for a1f and D
1
f .
Finally, parameter Xij is identified from equation (B.8), and parameter C will follow from equation (B.7) if
we can identify a0m and a0f . We do that by proving the next claim. Q.E.D.
Claim 3. Parameters K0m,K0f and a0m, a0f are identified from the time uses (leisure and home production) of
singles.
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Proof: The leisure equation for singles,
wje
0

























is a quadratic function of wj , which identifies K0f and D
0
f . Q.E.D.
Step 3: Sharing rule and the distribution of match-specific shocks
At this stage the sharing rule βij(z) is identified from leisure expenditures using equations (B.5) or (B.6).
Identification in step 2 was based on the co-variations of expenditures wie1m and wje1f across different match
types (i, j). The exact levels are determined by the sharing rule βij(z).
Now, remember that
βij(z) = β +
1
z














j + λ(1− β)
ˆ
Sijnm(i) di.
In the text we derived the following formulas for Sij and αij :

















































G−1(1− αij) + G [G−1(1− αij)]
.
Parameter θij is identified up to G or σ, as the matching probability αij is identified in step 1.

















































to system (B.16)-(B.17) if the right-hand side’s linear integral
operator is contracting. A sufficient condition for that is λβ
´
θij nf (j) dj < δ and λ(1−β)
´
θij nm(i) di < δ. We
have 0 ≤ θij ≤ 1. We will estimate meeting rates λNm ' λNf ' 0.15, δ = 0.038 and β ' 0.45. So λNmβ/δ ' 2. We
will estimate the mean of θij , averaged across i and j among singles, below 1/2. This is sufficient for identification.
Hence values BirV 0i , BjrV 0j can be identified up to β and G and given the distributions of types amongst
singles and the matching probabilities, which have already been identified in step 1. Then we get Sij from
equation (B.15) and F 1ijXij from equation (B.14). Although we cannot formally prove identification given the
amount of nonlinearities, we can yet safely base the identification of β and σ (the variance of z) on first and
second-order moments of the distribution of the sharing rule.
Step 4: Public good quality
The last parameter to identify is public good quality Zij . For this we can use equation (B.15) to deduce Sij
from BirV 0i + BjrV 0j . Then equation (B.14) allows to identify F 1ijXij . The identification of Zij finally results
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from equilibrium home production F 1ij :












APPENDIX C: ESTIMATION DETAILS
We first define the following residuals.
1. For single men, the residuals are
ε0i = d
0
i −D0i −K0mX0i /wi,
η0i = e
0




. Similar expressions can be obtained for single women.






fij −D1j −K1fXij/wj ,
η1mij = e
1
mij − a1i − a2mwi − biβijXij/wi,
η1fij = e
1




βij(z)|z ≥ G−1(1− αij)
]
(C.1)




|z ≥ G−1(1− αij)
]
(1− β)BirV 0i − βBjrV 0j
F 1ijXij
.
We solve the Fredholm equation for BirV 0i , BjrV 0j on the Chebyshev grids mentioned earlier. This allows

































thus become a standard linear system that can be solved by matrix inversion. See Appendix D for details.
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We minimize the sum of squared residuals ε, η and ν with respect to the parameters of preferences, home
production, β and σ. Once all these parameters have been estimated, we estimate public good quality Zij from















APPENDIX D: COMPUTATIONAL DETAILS
This appendix shortly describes the numerical tools used in estimation. The best reference here is Trefethen
(2013).
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D.1. Chebyshev nodes
We discretize continuous functions on a compact domain using Chebyshev grids. For example, let [x, x] denote










, k = 0, ..., n.
D.2. Clenshaw-Curtis quadrature









where the weights ωj can be easily computed using Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). The following MATLAB code
can be used to implement CC quadrature (Waldvogel, 2006):








Note that, although Gaussian quadrature provides exact evaluations of integrals for higher order polynomials
than CC, in practice CC works as well as Gaussian. On the other hand, quadrature weights are much more
difficult to calculate for Gaussian quadrature. See Trefethen (2008).
D.3. Integral equations
We need to solve functional fixed point equations. The standard algorithm to calculate the fixed point u(x) =
T [u](x) is to iterate up+1(x) = Tup(x) on a grid. If the fixed point operator T involves integrals, we simply iterate
the finite dimensional operator T̂ obtained by replacing the integrals by their approximations at grid points.
Example 1: equilibrium.
Using the previous approximations, an equation like
















It was sometimes necessary to “shrink” steps by using iterations of the form up+1 = up + θ(Tup − up) with
θ ∈ (0, 1]. A stepsize θ < 1 may help if T is not everywhere strictly contracting.








































This is a linear system that can be solved for after discretizing the state space, or value function iteration. Suppose
that i and j are discrete variables with weights ωi, ωj . Define the matrices
Θm = −λβ
δ
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and






















































but are more effectively calculated using FFT. A MATLAB code for DCT is, with y = (y0, ..., yn):
Y = y([1:n+1 n:-1:2],:);
Y = real(fft(Y/2/n));
Y = [Y(1,:); Y(2:n,:)+Y(2*n:-1:n+2,:); Y(n+1,:)];
f = @(x) cos(acos((2*x-(xmin+xmax))/(xmax-xmin))
*(0:n))*Y(1:n+1);
A bidimensional version is
Y = y([1:n+1 n:-1:2],:);
Y = real(fft(Y/2/n));
Y = [Y(1,:); Y(2:n,:)+Y(2*n:-1:n+2,:); Y(n+1,:)];
Y = Y(:,[1:n+1 n:-1:2]);
Y = real(fft(Y’/2/n));




The fact that the grid (x0, ..., xn) is not uniform and is denser towards the edges of the support interval allows
to minimize the interpolation error and thus avoids the standard problem of strong oscillations at the edges of
the interpolation interval (Runge’s phenomenon).
Another advantage of DCT is that, having calculated Y0, ..., Yn, then polynomial projections of y = (y0, ..., yn)
of any order p ≤ n are obtained by stopping the summation in (D.1) at k = p. Finally, it is easy to approximate
the derivative f ′ or the primitive
´







cos(k arccosx) dx =

x if k = 0,
x2
2




2(k−1) if k ≥ 2.
In calculating an approximation of the derivative, it is useful to smoothen the function by summing over only a








gave similar results as integrating the interpolated function.
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D.5. Kernels











for a kernel Kh with width h. When we use the model to predict this density, we use our estimate of the match
distribution m(wm, wf ) (omitting socio-demographic characteristics for simplicity, which we average over), which




































We do the same for earnings ratios.









































where α(wi, wj) is the predicted matching probability evaluated on the Chebyshev grid.
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